01 – OverviewConstruing commercial contracts

English courts pride themselves on their commercial pragmatism and readiness to uphold and give effect to commercial bargains freely struck between willing participants, however infelicitously expressed. A salutary remark by Lord Reid in Moschi v Lep Air Services Ltd [1973] A.C. 331, 344 continues to hold very true now, fifty years after he made it:

Parties are free to make any agreement they like and we must I think determine just what this agreement means.

Moschi v Lep Air Services Ltd [1973]

As part of the English law of contract, the courts have developed techniques of going about the determination of what an agreement means. At a high level of abstraction, the current iteration of the basic principles has been settled for close to a decade now by the very familiar trio of Supreme Court cases.[1] Of course, new intakes of higher courts judges continue to recite, refine and gloss over these principles, and there is no shortage of authority that examines almost every conceivable nuance in their application. Still, the basics are agreed for the time being, and the current judicial attitude may be encapsulated in an (unofficial) maxim:

In construing a contract, every single word counts.

Construction of a contract is an iterative process where all pleaded rival meanings of disputed words and expressions are considered in the context of the entirety of the contract and in light of their commercial consequences. The courts will consider both the internal construction of each clause and also the inter-relation of each clause with every other. They will select as true the meaning which best accords with the words used, the commercial tenor and purpose of the agreement and the admissible factual background.

Legal dogma has it that there is only one “true” meaning of any contractual provision. The court’s task is to find it. Contractual words and expressions which fall to be construed make the starting point and throughout the process remain the firm foundation of the entire exercise. Arguments from redundancy are of little weight and are seldom persuasive: every word counts and must be interpreted in the context of the relevant phrase, provision, clause and the entire contract, so as to produce a coherent true meaning. A construction must not be over-literal to the point that it loses sight of business common sense and commercial consequences of adopting the literal meaning. Yet a court must be careful not to rewrite the contracting parties’ improvident bargain which by its clear terms does not make good business sense for any or all of them.

After some vacillation, the courts have rejected attempts to elevate commercial common sense to the overarching test of construction. Resort to commercial common sense is only allowed in cases of genuine ambiguity in the language of the contract: if there are two genuinely rival meanings, the court will prefer that which accords better with business common sense. But if the meaning is clear then the courts will not second guess the commercial effect of that meaning. Courts do not mend bad bargains, and the loss from a bad bargain will be left to lie where it falls.

02 – Bespoke exerciseEach contract is construed on its own

Construction of contracts, though subject to general principles, is a bespoke exercise. Past cases in which specific contractual language was construed to arrive at a certain meaning are not considered strictly binding on issues of construction arising from the language of a different contract, however similar. (The only exception is construction of standard forms employed for making contracts in various industry sectors, such as shipping or commodities trading.) Each contract is construed on its own, with its own language and peculiar background to it. Some judges have expressed clear impatience with arguments by analogy from other contracts considered in other cases. Even the most minute differences in language are pored over closely and every nuance and shade of meaning are debated at length. This sometimes results in fairly simple cases of construction generating lengthy hair-splitting arguments which come with enormous costs.

Example – similar clauses, opposite outcomes

An agreement for a lease of land was made subject to conditions, and if those conditions “have not been satisfied on or before 30th June 1988, either party may at any time thereafter serve written notice on the other rescinding this agreement” (Miller’s Wharf Partnership v Corinthia Column Ltd [1991] 1 EGLR 192). The conditions were not satisfied by 30th June 1988 but were satisfied a bit later. Notice of rescission had been served after the conditions had been satisfied. The court held that the notice was good: it could be given at any time after the stated date. The notice was effective to rescind the contract.

In McGahon v Crest Nicholson Regeneration Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 842 a long leasehold was sold subject to a condition on terms that “if the said [condition has not been satisfied] by 1st June 2008 then either party shall have the right to rescind this contract”. The condition was not satisfied on 1 June but was satisfied on 17 September. On 29 September 2008 the purchaser gave notice of rescission for failure to satisfy the condition on 1 June and demanded back the deposit. The Court of Appeal held the notice bad and said there was no right to rescind.

The contract in McGahon was construed as meaning that notice of rescission can only be given while the condition remains unsatisfied. In Miller’s Wharf such construction was not available because it would be inconsistent with the express words “at any time thereafter”.

03 – Magic wordsWords with consequences defined by law

Some words in a contract have acquired a specialised technical meaning which produces defined consequences as a matter of law. In the course of contractual negotiations, it repays recognising these words and taking account of their distinctive characteristics.

“Represents” or “warrants”

Consider two variants of a provision in a contract for the sale of shares in a company:

Variant 1 – warranty

Seller hereby warrants that the Company had EBITDA of $1m in 2025

Variant 2 – representation

Seller hereby represents that the Company had EBITDA of $1m in 2025

Each word has its own consequence in terms of both liability and quantum in case the statement is untrue.

As for liability, a warranty will be breached if as a matter of fact the EBITDA for 2025 was lower than $1m. Nothing more is required. However, for there to be a misrepresentation, the purchaser must in addition to the factual inaccuracy of the statement also show that it had relied on the statement in the actual belief that it was accurate. If the seller shows that the purchaser was indifferent to the EBITDA, or had its own independent knowledge that the statement was inaccurate, the purchaser will have no claim.

As for differences in quantum, if we postulate that the actual EBITDA for 2025 was $500k, what is the compensation due to the purchaser?

An untrue warranty sounds in damages which are designed to place the purchaser in the same position as if the warranty had been true. This calls for compensation for loss of bargain, determined as a difference between (1) the true market price of the sold shares at the time of sale had the EBITDA been $1m as warranted and (2) the true market price of the shares at the time of sale with the actual EBITDA of $500k. Both figures are a matter of evidence. Figure (1) may or may not turn out to be the same as the actual price paid: the true market value of the shares may be higher or lower. If the purchaser underpaid against the market, he will recover a profit. If he had overpaid, the overpayment will be ignored and he will not recover it.

A misrepresentation sounds in damages designed to place the purchaser in the same position as if there had been no misrepresentation (i.e. no sale). The purchaser is compensated for loss on the actual deal, which is the difference between (1) the actual price paid and (2) the true market price of the shares at the time of sale with the actual EBITDA of $500k. If the purchaser overpaid against the market, he will recover the overpayment. If he underpaid, he will not get compensated for the loss of a good bargain.

“Condition”

What if a contractual term is broken? The common law makes a distinction between three types of terms. Consequences of a breach of a term will depend on what type of term it is.

  • Condition: any breach, however slight, entitles the aggrieved party to treat the contract as at an end.
  • Warranty: a breach sounds only in damages; no termination of the contract.
  • Intermediate term: a breach may or may not allow a party to terminate. That depends on whether the breach has deprived the other party of substantially the whole benefit which on the true construction of the contract the party was to obtain from the proper performance of the term which was breached.
Case – “condition” taken at its word

In Personal Touch Financial Services Ltd v Simplysure Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 461, a regulated financial adviser was retained under an agreement which stated at clause 7: “It is a condition of the Agreement that the Appointed Representative be aware of and abides by the rules of the regulator.” The court found that as a matter of construction clause 7 was a true condition, with the result that any breach of it was repudiatory (i.e. gave the client the power to terminate the agreement). It was accepted that the breach did not cause the client any loss but that was quite irrelevant. The word “condition” was given its literal meaning and full legal effect.

In the modern times, the word “condition” has lost its magic somewhat, in that it still falls to be construed in the context of the entire agreement. Loose employment of the word or absurd consequences of literal construction may lead the courts to treat it as an innominate term and not a true condition. That possibility was established in the Wickman Machine case discussed below.

“Time of the essence”

In the course of their commercial practice, AKTA lawyers frequently observed draft commercial contracts including language along the lines of “Time shall be of the essence of this contract”. The true significance of this form of words is not always appreciated, and they are often found buried among general boilerplate provisions rather than used judiciously in relation to specific obligations where their use would be appropriate.

What they do is render every contractual time or deadline into a true condition. That means that if a party misses the deadline by as long as one second, the other party may declare the contract at an end. Importantly, that effect is not liable to be diluted by construction: we are not aware of a reported case in which the words “time of the essence” were not treated as a true condition. It is easy to imagine the havoc which can be wrought by the generic, undiscriminating use of such language in a complicated contract which includes stipulations of time of varying degrees of importance.

Case – ten minutes too late

In Union Eagle Limited v Golden Achievement Limited [1997] AC 514, a contract for the sale of real property provided for completion to take place before 5 pm on 30 September. Payment of the purchase price at completion was to be made by cheque. The contract stated time was of the essence. The purchaser called the seller on 30 September at 5.01 to say the money was on its way by messenger. The messenger brought the cheque at 5.10. At 5.11 the seller gave the purchaser notice of rescission and returned the cheque.

The Privy Council found for the seller. Once 5 pm passed the purchaser no longer could complete the contract and could not insist on tender of money. “Slightly late” was too late in light of the contractual agreement that time was of the essence. The court has no jurisdiction (at law or in equity) to give relief against an “unconscionable” result where the parties agreed to that result. Contractual certainty was paramount even if the outcome could be perceived to be harsh.

Practice note – making time of the essence by notice

If time is not “of the essence” under the express terms of the contract, it can be made “of the essence” by unilateral notice:

  • once the contractual deadline for a party’s performance is missed;
  • the other party gives notice which (i) sets a new deadline (it must be a reasonable deadline) and (ii) requires the first party to give her performance within that new deadline;
  • the notice (iii) expressly makes time of the essence, e.g. by stating that the contract may be terminated if complete performance is not tendered within the extended deadline;
  • this kind of notice, and termination, is only possible if failure to meet the extended deadline is a sufficiently serious breach in its own right. That does not automatically follow from the notice but depends on the kind of contractual performance which has to be rendered.

AKTA lawyers have employed this technique in a situation of a sale of corporate securities upon exercise of an option. The option contract had no stipulation of time being of the essence. The purchaser party failed to complete the sale, and notice was given of a new extended deadline that was made of the essence. When completion did not occur by the new deadline, notice of rescission was given and the seller was able to retain the shares and resell them at a substantial premium over the option price.

“Trust”

Provisions of commercial contracts dealing with distribution or retention of funds may use the words “shall hold in/on trust for”. One has to beware of these words because they move the relationship out of the realm of contract and into the rules of equity governing trusts. That is a whole different world with complicated rules and significant consequences arising from a trust:

  • split of ownership into equitable and legal;
  • fiduciary duties of a trustee: a duty of loyalty (no self-dealing, no conflict of interest, account for secret profit) and a duty of care;
  • proprietary remedies (i.e. the ability to recover the funds as property, not as debt or damages);
  • tracing remedies (i.e. the ability to follow the funds into assets purchased with them and proceeds of sale of those assets);
  • equitable compensation remedies (somewhat akin to damages).

These incidents must be closely considered in the context of the contract and may be tempered (though not excluded entirely) by appropriately phrased disclaimers.

04 – ReprieveCorrection, rectification and common sense

In some cases, a reprieve may be available from the effects of a contractual provision which the party has, in the fullness of time since making the contract, come to find disagreeable or disadvantageous. A misnomer or error will be corrected as a matter of construction, e.g. the parties’ names, “seller” for “purchaser”, “2011” for “2001”, where the correct meaning is obvious from the context. A party may pursue an action for rectification of the contract on the basis that the words as written do not reflect the actual common intention of the parties which they shared when the contract was made. For this purpose, admissible evidence includes the parties’ negotiations leading up to the making of the contract: by contrast, this evidence is not admissible in construing the contract.

Commercial common sense is a reprieve of last resort but it is not a licence to rewrite the contract. The courts’ approach may be summed up in this way:

  • where the parties’ language is unambiguous, it must be applied whatever the commercial consequences;
  • ambiguity may yet be found if literal application yields a commercially improbable result;
  • if the language is ambiguous, the court will prefer a construction which is more in line with commercial common sense.
Case – common sense tempering a “condition”

In L Schuler AG v Wickman Machine Tool Sales Ltd [1974] AC 235, commercial common sense tempered the harsh effects of treating a contractual provision as a true condition.

A distributorship agreement provided that “it shall be a condition” that the distributor’s representatives shall be sent to six named firms once a week to solicit purchase orders for the manufacturer’s goods. Overall, this condition required 1,400 visits over the four-year contractual term. The distributor did not keep up the visits and the manufacturer sought to terminate the contract for breach of condition, without more. The manufacturer’s case was that the use of the word “condition” meant that any breach of the term (just one visit missed out of 1,400) was a repudiation.

The House of Lords said this was a very unreasonable result. The more unreasonable the result, the more unlikely that the parties intended it. This outcome was replaced by an obscure but more reasonable and practical interpretation, and rescission for repudiatory breach was refused.

The law is stated as at the date of publication. The information contained in this document is provided for general informational purposes only, does not constitute legal advice, and does not purport to be an exhaustive analysis of the issues addressed herein. Neither AKTA nor any of its employees accept any responsibility for any actions (or lack thereof) taken as a result of relying on or in any way using information contained in this document, and in no event shall they be liable for any losses resulting from reliance on or use of this information. For advice on specific circumstances, please contact AKTA.

Notes

  1. Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank [2011] UKSC 50; Arnold v Britton [2015] UKSC 36 and Wood v Capita Insurance Services Ltd [2017] UKSC 24.

Alexander Trukhtanov
Partner, AKTA